Prime minister Mikulas Dzurinda visited today the Children’s Hospital in the Bratislava district of Kramare. As he commented, his visit was a result of increased interest in the health care system during the second half of his election period. It is logical, as he said, that during the first two years of his government he was working more on foreign investments. Today, the time has come to satisfy priorities of sectors like education and health care, i.e. finance consuming sectors. Journal of the Radio Twist, Michal Dyttert, August 17, 2000 The government of Mikulas Dzurinda actually had been committed to implementing recommendations regarding foreign direct investments (FDI) during the first two years after elections in October, 1998. Further, it was strongly and broadly supportive of multinational corporations at the expense of domestic business. Therefore, in the second half of their election period, it is politically wise for governing parties to start expressing stronger interest in health care and education. Otherwise, it may happen that in the next elections they would not be reelected. This simple political scheme is typical for the whole postcommunist region. The stock of FDI, as of November 1999, was USD 2 billion according to Slovak Central Bank data. This relatively low figure (compared to neighbouring countries) is a consequence of the policy preferences of the Meciar Government which tended to spurn foreign investors seeking to participate in the privatization process in favour of his political supporters.[1] The new pro FDI government announced its “Strategy for Support of FDI Inflow” on March 9, 1999. This strategy sets out the measures being taken to treble the level of FDI in Slovakia over the next three to four years. As the government agency established to provide assistance to foreign corporation states, “indeed, Slovakia has commenced the ‘catching up’ process”. Together, Germany (22 %) and Austria (16.9 %) account for almost 40 % of FDI in Slovakia with the Netherlands (15 %), the United States (13 %), the United Kingdom (9.1 %) and the Czech Republic (8.6 %) representing other significant sources of FDI. Double standards International financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank often advocate a free market and the removal of trade barriers serving as protection mechanisms of domestic markets. However, while pressure from these institutions is focussed on the opening of poor economies to the global market and support of cheap export from them, at the same time they recommend poor countries to increase volumes of foreign investments. This is achievable only through mass incentives for foreign companies at the expense of tax payers and small and medium size domestic businesses. Such an approach makes business conditions uneven and the market environment, as a whole, becomes distorted. Slovakia is a spectacular example of this. Privately, IMF representatives admit that economic incentives for foreign corporations are not an ideal measure to deal with market deformations in the post-communist countries: ”The IMF does not support countries giving tax holidays to foreign direct investments. This policy should be stopped. Tax holidays are a result of a weak position of the governments in negotiations with those interested in privatization of state enterprises.” Such opinions, however, were never translated into official recommendations of the IMF. On the request of Friends of the Earth – Slovakia, the External Relation Department of the IMF provided the organization with an official position on this issue: “It is not the Fund’s policy to oppose the use of all tax incentives under all circumstances. It is the Fund’s view, however, that tax incentives are frequently not the most cost-effective instrument for promoting FDI... Furthermore, if not carefully designed and administered, tax incentives could often provide a fertile ground for abuse, corruption, and rent-seeking activities—as has been observed in many countries. ...the Fund maintains flexibility and judges the appropriateness of employing tax incentives in any country on a case-by-case basis. In the case of Slovak Republic, a recent FAD technical assistance mission did recommend, largely on evasion concerns, the removal of tax holidays introduced earlier this year, in view of the tax administration’s weak capacity to effectively enforce them.”[2] The World Bank, on the contrary, openly encourages governments to provide incentives for foreign companies: ”the IFC’s program includes [3] ... technical assistance to the Government to create an environment that is conducive to private business development, in particular for attracting fereign direct investment, in collaboration with MIGA [4] . ...MIGA will aim to provide technical assistance (with support from bilateral donors and in collaboration with the IFC) to help attract foreign direct investment... MIGA has already issued seven guarantees providing insurance coverage for political risks in support of foreign investment in the financial and telecommunication sectors, with current net exposure at $66.5 million.” [5] For years, the Slovak public has been frequently persuaded that one of the best ways to revitalize its economy and thus to improve the falling standard of living is to attract FDI, and lots of it. Some say this overlooks the fact that FDI can often be very damaging even to countries which, unlike Slovakia, already have mechanisms to cope with the investment, such as strong anti-corruption laws and regulations to direct the foreign funds to particular sectors. The result being that FDI rarely lives up to the expectations of the host country and can in fact be counter-productive to development. When business is a breeze: FDI incentives As mentioned above, one of the first reactions of the new government to international isolation was the adoption of a Strategy for Support of FDI Inflow. This document articulates the clear commitment of the new government to support major foreign investors whose production is designed to be exported, and to encourage inflow of foreign investment through a variety of financial, economic, legislative and administrative incentives. In April, 1999, the amendment to the Income Tax Act was applied. Under the amended law, foreign companies were granted complete tax holidays for five years if they invest in Slovakia in the amount corresponding to 5 million EURO. If, during such tax holidays, they invest another 5 million EURO, they will be granted a tax reduction of 50% during another five-year period. These exemptions will be granted subject to the condition that they export at least 60% of their total output. Other financial advantages are to entail the depreciation of tangible and intangible assets, zero customs duty on machinery and equipment, VAT tax exemption, exemption from the payment of real estate transfer tax, the provision of developed sites for a symbolic price, provision of state subsidies for fostering job creation, maintenance of existing jobs and retraining in the regions with high rates of unemployment, and reduction or waiver of the obligation to pay unemployment insurance contributions granted to those entrepreneurs who do business with the use of foreign capital. Furthermore, the government provided other advantages for big foreign investors. For example, it simplified the building permit procedure and legislation regulating the acquisition and purchase of land, it prepared the legislation on the establishment of industrial parks, special economic zones and privileged zones, etc. Currently, plans for building a number of such zones with complete infractructure covered from public funds is being considered. As early as a few months after elections, the government managed to adopt the draft law aimed at removing legal, administrative, and technical barriers which slow down the entry of strategic investors to Slovakia. This, translated into everyday language, amounts to the softening of statutory conditions for large foreign investors, e.g. to speed up legal procedures for the settlement of property rights to land.[6] The law follows the agreements that the Slovak government and some transnational corporations (e.g. Volkswagen AG) signed, as early as 1991, under which the government pledged, inter alia, to support the companies with the settlement of land property rights involved in their expansion in Slovakia. The public, naturally, did not know anything about these agreements. These are currently ”just” being realized. Another significant indirect subsidy for the FDIs is institutional support provided by the government. For example, a specialized Slovak Agency for Investment Development and Trade (SARIO) is financed from public funds and employs around 30 staff persons. Its objectives include active identification of the investment opportunities for foreign corporations and providing assistance to their investment projects. Along with SARIO there are other forms of institutional support for FDIs in place which can not be neglected to mention. One of them is the Bureau of Governmental Representative for Development of Car Production. The Bureau’s activities, in fact, reflects a lobby unit for the automobile industry, mainly the Volkswagen company. It prepares political conditions for adopting governmental measures to support the strategies of foreign private companies, e.g., huge state subsidies for infrastructure development in industrial zones. Myths as tools to legitimize government’s support of FDIs ”The expansion of production at Volkswagen, not only in its Bratislava plant but also in other plants throughout Slovakia, is a matter of public interest,”[7] said Ivan Miklos just a few weeks after he became deputy prime minister for the economy in January ,1999. His words deserve attention. The concept of public interest is not clearly defined by any law or other generally binding legal provision in Slovakia and, for this very reason, it has always been a favorite adage used by industrial lobbyists and state bureaucrats when they were defending projects lacking economic justification. According to government, FDI will bring a number of particularly positive effects for the economy of Slovakia in terms of creation of jobs, opportunities for small and medium-sized enterprises in the region, reduction of trade balance deficit, transfer of modern technologies, improving export efficiency, improved competitiveness, inflow of financial capital, and revitalization of the economy connected with spillover effects of FDI (increased purchasing power of the population, emergence of new entrepreneurial activities, revenues from corporate taxes, etc.). According to the statements of governmental experts, however, the government does not analyse real economic gains of its FDI support policy. No complex and updated overview of all incentives to attract foreign corporations has even been prepared. And there exists absolutely no cost assessment for the implementation of these measures. One may therefore expect that official justifications legitimizing proposals of governmental programs and strategies aimed at the overall prioritizing of FDI, or foreign companies in individual industrial sectors, are based on unproven assertions or rather, on dreams of liberal economists. And even more, fulfillment as well as justification of these optimistic expectations has never been monitored at all. Therefore these programs lack any feedback which inhibits the government from making any corrections in them in the future. In reality, only the content of the programs has been realized – and that means consumption of a considerable amount of public resources. FDI support programs in the Slovak economy thus mean a new category of state subsidies. It is more than evident that the state, on one hand, cuts down public expenses for education, environment, health care and social system, and on the other hand, channeled the saved resources towards FDI benefits which are quite disputable. Myth about job opportunities and regional development Besides tax holidays, industrial zones are another important way of subsidizing of FDI. The main official purpose of such zones is to decrease unemployment in the most stricken regions.[8] The first proposals for such parks are, however, all concentrated around the capital of Bratislava which represents the region with markedly lower unemployment than anywhere else. For example, the Zahorie industrial zone project is to attract foreign suppliers of components for a nearby Volkswagen plant, which will enable Volkswagon to increase its production by 90,000 cars every year (95% of them will be exported). The industrial zone is to create some 1,200 new jobs. The project is based on an assumption that the government will cover the costs of the infrastructure for the zone amounting to a total of SKK 290 mil.[9] This means that the creation of one new job will cost approximately SKK 240,000. In Slovakia, special micro-credit programs managed by non-for-profit organizations are already in place. These programs can create or stabilize one job through a small loan up to some SKK 20,000, provided to individuals under regular commercial conditions.[10] The programs are very flexible and thus may support creating jobs in the least developed rural regions. Moreover, their rate of return markedly exceeds 90%. If such a program would be given SKK 290 mil. from the state budget (which is to be frozen into the infrastructure development in the above mentioned industrial zone), in theory the state would help to create 14,500 new job, i.e. around 12 times more compared to the industrial zone. This is not to mention the fact that micro-credits are quickly recovered and these resources, increased by interests, can be made available for the creation of new jobs or for the sustainability of already created ones. This is not possible in the case of industrial zones since the resources remain mortified for ever in an infrastructure without any perspectives of generation of new jobs. Legal and economic conditions currently represent an effective barrier for the development of small, local businesses. Yet, liberal economist endorse the idea that the more serious the economic problems, the more intense are calls for people to take initiative into their own hands and to start their own businesses. Average small entrepreneurs, however, currently have no chance to acquire a loan from commercial banks in Slovakia, since they give only big loans for big companies and require a mountain of bureaucracy. Credit from commercial banks are, therefore, for the vast majority of the population unaccessible. The banks are thus not able to solve the problem of high unemployment, nor the problem of increasing regional disparities and rural unemployment. Government has no available resources for these purposes as well, since resources saved from cutting of the public expenses are uneffectively being relocated to subsidies for FDIs. Further, data on the high return of the above mentioned micro-loan program is very interesting. It is in sharp contrast with the fact that almost 30% of loans from state controlled big commercial banks in Slovakia are classified loans (i.e. loans which are not likely to be paid-back).[11] At the moment, the government, pushed by the World Bank and the IMF, is preparing privatization of the four largest finantial institutions in Slovakia. Since nobody will buy banks which were indebted due to a huge volume of bad loans, government is preparing their ”sanitation”. This process includes the transfer of debts and bad loans of the above mentioned banks to the state owned Slovak Consolidation Bank (the estimated total of SKK 100 billion),[12] where they will be satisfied through public sources. Sanitized (i.e. heavily subsidized) banks will then be ready for sale. In this process, the state is selling its last profitable companies which have the potential to cover the growing needs of the so called non-productive sectors, e.g. public transport or health care, the operations of which are impossible without subsidies. A similar privatization process is under way in the case of the last lucrative state companies (e.g. Slovak Telecommunications). A main reason for such a state of privatization is the government’s need for ‘fast money’ to cover the short-term foreign loans. Since, according to law, income from privatization is a direct income of the state budget it is expected that the raised funds will never be used for development programs which could in the future replace the potential income of the privatized banks and companies that the governments just loses. FDI certainly creates jobs but it does not necessarily create more jobs. [13] FDI can actually destroy jobs. For example, if a foreign supermarket chains (such as TESCO or BILLA) were to establish a number of stores in Slovakia, the number of people hired may not offset the number of people who lose their jobs as a result of their smaller grocery stores not being able to compete with the foreign supermarket and being forced out of business. Along with local store owners there are numerous local suppliers who are run out of business as well. Myth on reduction of the trade deficit The trade deficit indicates the ratio between exports and imports during a certain period (e.g. a year) of the given country. A stable and high trade deficit is not desirable from the country’s point of view because it means that its imports exceed exports and that the state has to earn foreign currency to cover the balance. The major source of foreign currency for poor countries is the export of raw materials and natural resources (i.e. commodities with no or a low value added such as raw timber, aluminium or steel in the case of Slovakia). Although FDI may be used to set up plants to serve export markets, the components and raw materials they use are often imported. Thus, if a significant proportion of their output is sold in the host country, their activities can make the trade deficit worse rather than better. But even if the private company represents an important exporter and imports are a significant portion of the production components, its role in the reduction of the trade deficit is still questionable. Finally, the country may not see any benefit from the income of hard currency of the foreign corporations, in particular if the company applies for tax holidays and other incentives provided by the government. If, on the other hand, FDI is used to provide finance for a business serving the local market, such as telephone services, after the initial capital inflow it will lead to a permanent annual flow of profits out of the country and thus worsen the trade deficit. This happens simply because in many cases foreign corporations invest their income abroad because it makes no economic sence to keep the money in a given country. Moreover, during periods in which FDI is flowing strongly into a country, the exchange rate of its national currency with the rest of the world strengthens. This makes imports cheaper, thus exposing indigenous manufacturers to increased foreign competition and cutting their profits. Exporters will suffer too, as their products become more expensive on the international market. Permanent damage may be done to both types of business with the result that when the FDI flow ceases, the country will be in a worse position than previously to generate export sales and to compete in the home market. The balance of payments position could be permanently damaged. Myth on new technologies Sylvia Ostry, Canadian academic and former trade negotiator, has stated that, although there is technology transfer between parent and subsidiary of a transnational corporation, there is no evidence of technology diffusion within the host country.[14] According to some analysts, there is no evidence that transnational corporations and FDI promote technology and development in host countries. On the contrary, in their attempts to attract FDIs poor countries themselves subsidize the research of FDIs and provide the companies with their software, databases, personal and technical resorces and facilities. The program for the Development of the Automobile Industry in the Slovak Republic adopted by the government in July, 1998, includes various projects to support car manufacturers. One of them is the Program of Research and Development for Car Production aimed at support of specific research at universities, Academy of Sciences, and businesses. The program assumes development of a car production research center. Developing countries often believe that FDIs in their country will finance research and development and through this introduce technology. In fact, however, there is very little research and development conducted by FDIs in developing countries, and that which does exist mostly goes toward activities related to adaptation of processes to local conditions or to technical support and trouble shooting.[15] FDI may actually reduce research and development within the host country. In Brazil, for example, few major car manufacturers acquired large domestic auto part producers. As a result, the research and development activities of the local firms were downgraded and their frontier research was relocated to the parent firms‘ research and development centers in the home countries.[16] There is currently little debate about alternative ways in which technology can be introduced, such as employing individual foreigners who know and understand it.[17] Moreover, the debate over the need for introducing technology ignores consideration of whether these new technologies, which suit the interests of transnational corporations, are in fact in the best interests of Slovakia. For example, new technologies may wind up replacing more jobs than FDI creates. Furthermore, some technology may increase environmental degradation (e.g. increased use of fossil fuels, faster extraction rates in logging or mining practices, etc.). The pursuit of technology is absent of any considerations for a process of selecting which technologies are to be introduced, so as to best benefit the host country. Myth on the increase of a country’s export performance According to oponents of export-led development, FDI helps a country to become dependent on new, highly competitive and highly unstable foreign markets. Both exports and imports can be expected to increase and the country will lose the ability to run its own affairs. The Asian financial crisis illustrates this point well. The crisis began with the devaluing of the Baht, the Thai national currency. This led to regional panic as Thailand was a very open economy with which many countries in the region were strongly integrated. Foreign investors left the region in mass and fast manner leaving behind decapitalized economies extremely dependent on external funds. As Asia’s crisis worsened, countries dependent on exports to Asia also began experiencing economic decline. The result was that the world nearly witnessed the collapse of the global economy on a scale not seen since the 1930’s. Although the ability of the United States to absorb the worlds exports saved such a collapse there is no such guarantee for the future. Moreover, the Asian economies remained uprooted. Myth of increased competitiveness in the country The truth is that FDI could well lead to a loss of competitiveness if it increases the barriers to entry in the sectors in which it operates and thus makes it more difficult for new competitors to become established. The Irish economist Richard Douthwaite explains the experience in Ireland, “in 1973, when there was a bacon factory in almost every Irish town, half of the price the consumer paid for pork and bacon got back to the farmer. Today, in order to be able to export world-wide, only six pig processing plants are left, all built to US Department of Agriculture standards. These factories have a great deal of power over the domestic market with the result that only 20% of the price the customer pays gets back to the farm.”[18] Small and medium-sized firms are usually highly flexible and competitive: FDI often threatens their survival. Such a situation arose in Slovakia regarding the market with dairy products. Volkswagen: Since 1991 we have been trying to help the weaker [19] Penetration of transnational corporations to poor countries follows its own rules of the game. For example, instead of Volkswagen first asking the Slovak government to be given a possibility to operate in Slovakia, it is, in fact, Dzurinda’s cabinet that seeks the favor of the company. The government offers the company a number of incentives that would put it at an advantage over other companies. Along with incentives that are general for any large foreign corporation, Volkswagen enjoys a number of special incentives which it successfully lobbied for with active assistance from special public agencies. This approach is absurd if we look at it from the perspective of the so often mentioned sustainable development model. But, judged on purely economic grounds, it does have its pervert logic: the economic strength of Volkswagen significantly surpasses the overal economic potential of the entire Slovak economy. While total 1998 state budget revenues of the Slovak Republic fell below USD 5 billion, the revenues of Volkswagen for the same year amounted to USD 75 billion,[20] more than 15 times.[21] Free market advocates argue that the above mentioned economic behavior of the Slovak government simply copies the laws of the nature, that is, the stronger side defines the conditions. They think this is normal. But there are others who believe that, first of all, there are no such laws within nature and, second, that this is neither natural nor just, and not even economically justified. According to the Slovak government other states also ”are striving to attract foreign investors by granting them financial incentives (tax concessions and holidays, zero customs duties on imports, state grants for research and development, assistance in infrastructure development, etc.) and non-financial incentives (retraining workers at the cost of the host country, agencies for foreign investment promotion).”[22] This is also due to the fact that countries are pushed by the World Bank to adopt these policies. If Slovakia did not actively seek FDIs, the investments would pass on. The question still is whether investments of such type bring benefits which exceed the losses. To answer this question one would need to know what the company will receive, in a direct or indirect and financial and non-financial form, from the government in total and what the overall societal benefits are from the company. At the same time the cost-benefit analysis concerning such subsidies should be made for cases that they would be used for alternative purposes. There are many areas which, if there were government incentives stimulating their development, would bring significant benefits to society. One of them is use of renewable energy, e.g. through the small hydroelectric plants (SHEP). A total of 3,097operational SHEPs were in existence in Slovakia in 1930. Their total installed capacity was more than 37 MW. During the fifties and the sixties, an overwhelming majority of them fell victim to the socialist generation of electric power. According to the estimates of specialists, SHEP could use hydro-energy potential of smaller rivers and streams to generate around 1,220 GWh/year, while the current use is only 11% of this figure [23] (the Gabcikovo hydro-electric system, one of the most controversial dam projects in Europe, generates just over 800 GWh/year). [24] In addition to the fact that the SHEPs produce electricity in an incomparably more friendly manner than large hydroelectric plants or nuclear power plants, they could also contribute to a strategically important decentralization and diversification of electricity production, a number of people could be involved in their construction and operation (and in the production of individual components) and, in particular, they would be more cost-effective and would cover the needs of their immediate surroundings. Current legislative and economic conditions constitute a perfect barrier to a more intensive use of SHEPs and have already discouraged most of the enthusiasts who tried to revive them after the revolution. The problem for the producers is that they must sell electric power to the state at low prices and, as a result, the return on the costs of the project is much too slow; while at the same time, the banks would not extend them anything other than short-term investment credits. Instead of financial incentives and institutional support for a foreign car manufacturer, the country could derive incomparably greater strategic, social and environmental benefits from introducing measures to stimulate the use of renewable sources of energy. Another question which remains to be answered is why the very extensive incentives described above have been granted to a foreign car manufacturer rather than to other subjects, even including those operating in the same sector, whose need for them is incomparably greater? For instance, they could have been granted to the manufacturers of buses of which there is an acute shortage in Slovakia. They could be used to improve the quality of public transportation which is falling every day, although it daily serves hundreds of thousands of people. They could help preserve thousands of jobs, not only for the producers or drivers of buses, but also for a large number of people from rural areas whose job opportunities are threatened because of deteriorating transport connections. It is strange when the government, in the effort to reduce the trade balance deficit decides to grant extensive advantages to a foreign car-manufacturer and at the same time it defends the need to give priority to foreign bus manufacturers over domestic ones. [25] Similarly one could address the government’s approach towards the railways, which are about to lay off twenty thousand employees (Volkswagen Slovakia employed approximately 6,500 workers in July, 2000). [26] What objective reasons are there to meet the needs of a private car-making plant by building one thousand new flats, a railroad station, a highway approach road leading directly to the entrance gate of the plant, by adjusting labor market policy and by adapting the curricula of state schools, by reducing the harshness of important legislation, etc.? Similarly, one could think about energy savings, development of combined transport, gasification of the city transport, small enterprises, and so on. Race to the bottom in postcommunist Europe The Race to the Bottom theory states that countries compete fiercely with one another to attract the most FDIs in order to obtain the somewhat mythical benefits mentioned above. In this competition, nations offer ever growing financial and other incentives in the hope to attract the FDIs at the expense of the taxpayers and local businesses. The result is an overall loss for the competing countries while the transnational corporations win even greater benefits. Poor countries which desperately need assistance thus subside to uncomparably stronger economies. Unfortunately, however, it is difficult for one country to opt out of the game. If a country decides not to engage in such destructive behavior they will likely be boycotted by most transnational institutions and financial groups and would receive heavy pressure from the powerful rich countries to reverse their policy. The net result is that no country has the courage to break from the destructive game because they are unconvinced of alternative economic development strategies that do not require a great deal of external economic participation. What is needed then is to push for more democracy and transparency in the economic decision-making of government and support economic development based on domestic production and greater local self-reliance rather than the export led development strategies currently in vogue. However, if such strategies are to successfully change the policy of the national government they must follow the sustantial change of the policies of the Brettonwood institutions.
Footnotes: [1] Authoritarian and nacionalistic government of Vladimir Meciar ruled Slovakia in 1992-1993 and then in 1994-1998. The latter period was accompanied by unprecedential corruption and robbery of the public property in the privatization process. replaced by the government of Mikulas Dzurinda [2] Letter of Thomas C. Dawson,Director External Relations Department of the IMF to Ryan Hunter of Friends of the Earth – Slovakia, September 5, 2000. [3] IFC - International Finance Corporation , a member of the World Bank Group providing loans for private corporations. [4] MIGA – Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, a member of the World Bank Group providing quarantees for private foreign investments. [5] Slovakia: Country Assistance Strategy, Informal Note, The World Bank, January 2000. [6] Communique from the government´s session of 6 May 1999, www page of the Office of Government of the Slovak Republic, May 6, 1999. [7] Vo verejnom zaujme: podpora vlady VW Slovakia (In public interest: government´s support for VW Slovakia), Maros Sykora, Pravda, January 19, 1999. [8] Strategy for the Support of Entry of Foreign Investment into the Slovak Republic, approved by the government of the Slovak Republic on 9 March1999. [9] The document was prepared by the Bureau of Governmental Representative for Development of Car Production and then submitted by minister of economy to the Government in July 2000. [10] There is a number of similar effective micro-credit programs, e.g. in Kyrgistan, Georgia, India, Armenia, etc. [11] Slovakia: Country Assistance Strategy, Informal Note, The World Bank, January 2000. [12] Jan Kovalcik: Aktiva bank na Slovensku vlani prvykrat klesli pod uroven rocneho hrubeho domaceho produktu (Bnaks’ Assets for the First Time Falled Bellow the Level of Annual GDP Last Year), Trend, 13.9.2000. [13] Douthwaite, Richard. Interactions CEPA has had with the author. [14] Raghavan, Chakravarthi. Development: No Investment Rules Reducing Flexibility. South-North Development Monitor (SUNS). Email Edition, pg. 2. September 27, 1999. [15] Raghavan, Chakravarthi. Development: No Investment Rules Reducing Flexibility. South-North Development Monitor (SUNS). Email Edition, pg. 2. September 27, 1999. [16] United Nations Commission on Trade and Development. World Investment Report 1999. [17] Douthwaite, Richard. Interactions CEPA has had with the author. [18] Douthwaite, Richard. Interactions CEPA has had with the author. [19] Eva Reiselová: Helping Weakers by the Strongers Should be Obvious. Trend No. 27/1998. Interview with representative of Volkswagen on the company’s charitatable activities. [20] The Global Six, Keith Neughton, Karen Lowry Miller and Joann Muller, Business Week, European Edition, January 25, 1999. [21] Source: Central Bank of Slovakia, 2000. [22] Strategy for the Support of Entry of Foreign Investment into the Slovak Republic, approved by the government of the Slovak Republic on 9 March1999. [23] Obnovitelne zdroje energie (Renewable energy sources) , RNDr. Emil Bedi, SZOPK and Alternative Energy Fund, 1993. [24] Energeticke rezervy Slovenska (Energy reserves of Slovakia), Alternative Energy Fund, 1994. [25] Slovenska vlada by mala dodrzat svoje sluby pri podpore slovenskych producentov autobusov (The Slovak government should keep its promise to support Slovak bus manufacturers), SME – Kapital, March 16,1999. [26] Jozef Prosnan: Jozef Uhrik: Stat musi sledovat prioritu zamestnanosti (State Has to Follow Priority of Employement), Trend, July 12, 2000.